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ABSTRACT
For the fifteen years prior to the Supreme Court s 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, $civil rights# did not refer to a unified,
coherent category. Rather, the content of the term was open, changing,
and contradictory. The lawyers of the Civil Rights Section of the De-
partment of Justice, which was created in 1939, were among those
thinking about, and experimenting with, different ways of practicing
and framing civil rights in the 1940s. Their practice shows how, as the
Great Depression faded and World War II loomed, the most promi-
nent civil rights issues shifted from the labor arena to the rights of mi-
norities, especially African Americans. Because of the doctrinal un-
certainties that accompanied the demise of the Lochner era, the law-
yers of the Civil Rights Section looked to Reconstruction for inspira-
tion, constitutional authority, and federal power. As the Section s law-
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yers explored the boundaries of their new authority, they emphasized
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude
statutes. They came to use the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for
attacking legal and economic coercion broadly defined.
This Article narrates the history of the Civil Rights Section and
analyzes its practice as a moment in the creation of modern civil rights
law. Emphasizing that the wartime turn to racial issues did not elimi-
nate labor from the Section s civil rights practice, it describes the reso-
nances between the Section s civil rights framework—and its uses of
the Thirteenth Amendment in particular—and both Reconstruction
era and New Deal notions of free labor. Viewed against the backdrop
of a historical concern with labor and the mid-century realities of in-
voluntary servitude, we can see in the Section s practice a framework
for a labor-infused civil rights that has, for the most part, since been
lost.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1954 civil rights victory of Brown v. Board of Education1 is
one of the most commonly told stories in American constitutional
law: Thurgood Marshall and the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP)2 heroically convinced a cou-
rageous Supreme Court to resurrect the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle for racial progress after its
half century of ignominy following Plessy v. Ferguson3 in 1896.4 Yet
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. In 1939, motivated principally by tax considerations, the NAACP separated out its
legal activities into the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, commonly called the Inc.
Fund. MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 27 (1994). The activities of the NAACP
and the Inc. Fund remained considerably intertwined until the mid-1950s. Id. (discussing how
Marshall served as special counsel to the NAACP and stating that part of NAACP Executive
Secretary Walter White’s salary was paid by the Inc. Fund). Only in 1956 did they separate to a
greater extent, partly because of IRS complications and partly because of differing agendas. Id.
at 27, 310. For simplicity, I refer to the NAACP lawyers simply as the NAACP, even though the
activities of the NAACP as a whole clearly extended well beyond litigation.
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, at x (1976) (referring to the Brown
decision as “the turning point in America’s willingness to face the consequences of centuries of
racial discrimination”); TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 27-28 (detailing the NAACP’s lobbying ef-
forts, during the 1930s, for a federal law against lynching). But see Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board
of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-26 (1980) (ar-
guing that the Brown decision resulted not from heroism but from a short-lived convergence of
white and African American interests); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 76 (1994) (arguing that the main consequence of
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this story is a partial one at best. It fails to recognize that during
World War II and the years that followed, the concept of civil rights
looked very different from the way it looked after Brown, from the
way it looks today, and from the way it looked during the half century
that preceded the war. In fact, at the time, “civil rights” did not refer
to a unified, coherent category; the content of the term was open,
changing, and contradictory, carrying resonances of the past as well as
of several possible contending futures.
This confusion and uncertainty have remained invisible to consti-
tutional scholars chiefly because of the scope of their inquiries.5
Scholars seem to have accepted unquestioningly that modern civil
rights should be located in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, failing to examine
how these rights came to be thus situated. While commentators
largely have overlooked the period from 1939 to 1954,6 I argue that it
Brown was a heightened defense of Jim Crow by white southerners, and that Brown led to racial
progress only indirectly, in response to violence against African Americans); Kenneth W. Mack,
Black Lawyering in the Early Twentieth Century: Race Leadership and the Markers of Profes-
sional Authority 2-3 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (dis-
cussing the ways in which African American lawyers at mid-century were concerned not only
with civil rights litigation but also with enhancing their professional standing).
5. A few scholars have begun to explore alternative origins and conceptions of civil rights
in the second half of the twentieth century. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST
REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 (forthcoming 2001)
(discussing the development of civil rights in New York as growing out of the integrationist
efforts of white ethnic and religious minorities); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal
Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 80 (1999) (presenting a vision of a “labor-based civil rights
movement” that never realized its potential during and after the New Deal). Scholars since mid-
century have referred to the years prior to Brown as the “passive period.” John P. Frank, Court
and Constitution: The Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. REV. 400, 403-04 (1951); see also Bruce Ack-
erman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2334 (1999) (discussing the “tentative
suggestions” of the Court during the late 1930s). See generally Barry Friedman, An Academic
Obsession (The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part III) 2, 8-16 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing “the quiet years of the 1940s”).
6. There are exceptions. See generally NELSON, supra note 5 (detailing the rise of New
York’s civil rights movement); HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948) (studying
the politics and values of the Roosevelt-era Court and their influence on that Court’s decisions);
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 116-125 (discussing the NAACP’s attack on segregated education
from 1939-1945); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEG-
REGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (recounting the NAACP’s campaign against segre-
gated schools from the mid-1920s to its culmination in the early 1950s, including a discussion of
the activities of the 1940s); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 2334 (describing the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence during the 1930s as “tentative”); Daniel R. Ernst, The Ideal and the Actual in the
State: Willard Hurst at the Board of Economic Warfare, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON WORLD WAR II (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., forthcoming 2001) (ex-
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was of critical importance to the subsequent development of civil
rights. And while the Supreme Court and litigants like the NAACP
usually have monopolized scholarly attention,7 I turn a lens toward
constitutional experimentation in the executive branch. I argue that
developments in the 1940s are crucial to understanding Brown’s
meaning and that the activities of the newly created Civil Rights Sec-
tion of the Department of Justice are crucial to understanding
emerging conceptions of civil rights in the 1940s.
This Article narrates the unfamiliar story of the “little and little
known unit” of the Department of Justice,8 whose lawyers were
among those thinking about, and experimenting with, different ways
of practicing and framing civil rights in the 1940s.9 It shows how and
why, with understandings of civil rights up for grabs, these lawyers
amining the effect of wartime administrative service on the future “dean of American legal
historians”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Forbath, supra note 5 (discussing the post–
New Deal civil rights movement and its connections to the labor movement); Frank, supra note
5, at 400 (describing the years preceding Brown as the “passive period”); Martha Biondi, The
Struggle for Black Equality in New York City, 1945-1955 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Columbia University) (examining how the African American civil rights movement re-
shaped post–World War II New York) (on file with the Columbia University Library); Fried-
man, supra note 5 (arguing that the 1940s were a period of relative inaction by the Court).
7. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993) (arguing that courts are poor instruments for social change).
Ernst is again an exception. See generally Ernst, supra note 6.
8. Henry Putzel, Jr., Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal, 99 U. PA. L.
REV. 439, 441-42 (1951).
9. Staff publications were abundant. E.g., Francis Biddle, Civil Rights in Times of Stress, 2
BILL RTS. REV. 13, 15 (1941) (outlining civil rights issues for America to consider while in the
“twilight zone” directly before its entrance into World War II); Sydney Brodie, The Federally-
Secured Rights to Be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367 (1952); Frank Coleman, Freedom
from Fear on the Home Front, 29 IOWA L. REV. 415, 415 (1944) (discussing how “[m]emories of
the last war came back” when the incidence of lynching again seemed on the rise in World War
II); Victor W. Rotnem, Civil Rights During War: The Role of the Federal Government, 29 IOWA
L. REV. 409, 409 (1944) [hereinafter Rotnem, Civil Rights During War] (“With the challenge to
the ideals of democracy of the ideologies of fascism and communism, we who had long taken
our democratic faith for granted have had a quickened sense of the values of a government
based on the belief in the dignity and rights of the individual.”); Victor W. Rotnem, Clarification
of the Civil Rights’ [sic] Statutes, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 252, 260 (1942) [hereinafter Rotnem, Clarifi-
cation]; Victor W. Rotnem, Criminal Enforcement of Federal Civil Rights, LAW. GUILD REV.,
May 1942, at 18 [hereinafter Rotnem, Criminal Enforcement]; Victor W. Rotnem, The Federal
Civil Right “Not to Be Lynched,” 28 WASH. U. L.Q. 57 (1943) [hereinafter Rotnem, Right “Not
to Be Lynched”]; Victor W. Rotnem, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction of Labor’s Civil Rights, 2
LAW. GUILD REV., Sept. 1942, at 21 [hereinafter Rotnem, Labor’s Civil Rights]; Henry A.
Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice, 1 BILL RTS. REV. 206, 206
(1941).
GOLUBOFF 06/24/01 11:07 AM
1614 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1609
turned to the Thirteenth Amendment10 as a constitutional basis for
civil rights protection. That amendment abolished slavery in 1865 and,
by the start of the twentieth century, seemed to prohibit only a nar-
row type of involuntary servitude based on debt, called peonage. In
the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, Civil Rights Section lawyers
came to use the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for instituting
“free labor,” broadly defined, and for prohibiting various kinds of le-
gal and economic coercion.
Part I begins with the creation of the Civil Rights Section in 1939.
It argues that although the Section originated out of 1930s concerns
with labor rights, World War II dramatically changed the direction of
its mandate. Wartime pressures for civil rights pushed government
officials, lawyers, and scholars toward the protection of minorities.
This shift stemmed from apprehension about contagious totalitarian-
ism and fears of Japanese propaganda, overzealous wartime patriots,
and increased African American organization and protest. This part
concludes that for largely political reasons, civil rights protection of
minorities in general, and of African Americans in particular, in-
creased in prominence during the war. This does not mean that the
civil rights of minorities were actually protected during the war, as the
internment of Japanese Americans readily demonstrates.11
The contours of these rights were as yet undetermined within le-
gal doctrine and institutions, however. Part II depicts the way in
which the Civil Rights Section lawyers understood the possibilities for
developing civil rights doctrine. The demise of the Lochner12 era with
the judicial validation of the New Deal had created space for novel
interpretations of individual rights and new doctrines addressing the
role of government in protecting those rights. How large that space
would be and what would fill it remained uncertain. For inspiration
and authority, Section lawyers turned to a time before the Lochner
era. They looked back to Reconstruction for both statutory and con-
stitutional authority and for a more robust understanding of federal
power.
10. The amendment reads in full: “Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST., amend. XIII.
11. See infra note 82.
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Part III discusses one aspect of the Reconstruction legacy that
the Civil Rights Section revived. As the Section’s lawyers explored
the boundaries of their new authority, they emphasized enforcement
of the Thirteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude statutes.
Both as a result of doctrinal concerns about federal jurisdiction and
the state action requirement and because of the heightened rights
consciousness of many African Americans regarding the Thirteenth
Amendment, what appeared earlier in the century to be a rather
small set of harms redressable under that amendment took on far
greater importance during World War II.
Because of the relative ease of invoking the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, members of the Justice Department sought to expand the scope
of its enforcement authority. Part IV follows the Department’s prose-
cution of peonage and involuntary servitude cases through the 1940s
and into the 1950s, showing how the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment changed and expanded during that period. As complain-
ants broadened their definitions of involuntary servitude, so too the
Justice Department lawyers broadened the scope of their prosecuto-
rial ambitions. Increasingly, the existence of abhorrent labor condi-
tions—meager wages for back-breaking work accompanied by inhu-
mane treatment—became the target of federal action under the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
Part V analyzes the Civil Rights Section’s practice as a moment
in the creation of modern civil rights. It emphasizes that the wartime
turn to racial issues did not eliminate labor from the Section’s civil
rights practice. It shows the importance of labor concerns to that
practice and describes the resonance between the Section’s civil rights
framework and both Reconstruction era and New Deal notions of
free labor. This part argues that the Section’s use of the Thirteenth
Amendment enabled it to combine the past with the present, to link
long-standing ideas about free labor with contemporary forms of co-
erced labor, and to parallel New Deal transformations in labor rights
with broadening definitions of involuntary servitude. Finally, the
Conclusion suggests that in the Department of Justice’s Thirteenth
Amendment practice—viewed against the backdrop of a historical
concern with labor and the mid-century realities of involuntary
servitude—we can see a framework for a labor-infused civil rights
that has, for the most part, since been lost.
